In his 1975 paper, Nordhaus formally proves that governments whose aim is to be reelected, will generate 'political' business cycles. Empirical results do not confirm this proposition, especially in countries used to early elections.
Introduction
In his 1975 paper, Nordhaus shows that if the ruling political party (or coalition) has a myopic 1 vote maximizing behavior, and the economy is represented by a dynamic Phillips-curve, a purely political business cycle is generated, with high unemployment (and low inflation) during the period immediately following the election, and low unemployment (and high inflation) on the eve of the coming election.
This simplified model which does not include adjustment lags predicts that the unemployment rate must be falling over the entire period between two elections. Several authors, including Nordhaus himself, have tried to find some historical evidence of the theory. Nordhaus has shown that the theory holds in three of the nine countries studied, with strongest conformity for the United States. This is confirmed in a paper by McRae (1977) . McCallum (1978) , using a different set of statistical tests, disputes the conclusion and offers two alternative explanations: either, the successive U.S. administrations 
Public Choice 40:155-164 (1983).
simply have not used the unemployment-inflation trade-off or, the administrations cannot, even if they so desire, make use of the trade-off, in a world ruled by rational expectations.
Evidence is even less strong in most of the other democracies, as shown by Paldam (1979) who, though he deals only with cases in which governments remained in power throughout the normal election period -the most favorable case-finds a very weak cycle and no election-year effect in the data.
The main reason, usually given to explain these findings, is that governments have little and imperfect control over the business cycle, because of exogenous shocks, limited understanding among politicians of economic problems, various lags in the political system, etc. (see, e.g., Lindbeck, 1976) .
A somewhat closer look at Nordhaus' empirical results may point to a different reason. Although, in theory, unemployment decreases over the entire cycle, Nordhaus tests the hypothesis that, for an electoral period of length T, T the unemployment rate rises during the first -~-years and falls during the T remaining ~-years. The test is performed on data between 1947 and 1972, in nine democracies. The results, reproduced in Table 1 .1, are summarized by the probability rc 'that the number of successful theoretical predictions would have occurred by chance if the probability of a rise or fall is one half and independent ' (Nordhaus, 1975: 186) . The second line of Table 1 .1 gives, for each country, the ratio of the number of early elections to that of total elections during the period 1947-48 to 1976-77. 2 This table gives strong support to the assumption that the political business cycle is more likely to appear or more likely to be detected or both, in countries like the F.R. of Germany, New Zealand and the United States where the electoral cycle is stable: more likely to appear, since politicians feel relatively sure of generating expansion in time, i.e., before a new election is called; more likely to be detected, since, ifa new election is called before the legal term, the cycle, if it has been initiated, will usually be 'unfinished'. 
